This paper shows that for Spinoza an immanent cause [causa immanens] is a species of the Aristotelian efficient cause that assimilates the latter with inherence. I also discuss the relationship between inherence and the material cause and suggest an explanation for Spinoza's avoidance of the terminology of material cause.
I
n his groundbreaking work of 1969, spinoza's Metaphysics: An essay in interpretation, Edwin Curley attacked the traditional understanding of the substance-mode relation in Spinoza, according to which Spinozistic modes inhere in their substance. Curley argued that such an interpretation ascribes to Spinoza the committing of an obvious category mistake.
Spinoza's modes are, prima facie, of the wrong logical type to be related to substance in the same way Descartes' modes are related to the substance, for they are particular things (E1p25c), not qualities. And it is difficult to know what it would mean to say that particular things inhere in substance. When qualities are said to inhere in substance, this may be viewed as a way of saying that they are predicated of it. What it would mean to say that one thing is predicated of another is a mystery that needs solving.
1
In addition to putting forward the "wrong logical type" argument (and three other arguments cited from Bayle's 'Spinoza' entry), Curley suggests that to view particular things as God's properties would result in a certain odd conclusion, given Spinoza's view of God as the cause of all things (E1p16c1 2 ). If a mode is a property of God and God is the cause of all modes, then God turns out to be the cause of his own properties. Yet, asks Curley, "how can a subject cause itself to have the properties it has? How can the relation of inherence which a property has to its subject be anything like the relation an effect has to its cause?" 3 While I do not agree with Curley's criticism and his alternative interpretation, 4 I do think he raises several crucial and very interesting points. Particularly, I think he is right in pointing out that the relation between inherence and causation in Spinoza deserves
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5
Yet, if I understand Curley's point correctly, the issue is not the possibility of some coincidental overlap between the two relations, but rather what appears to be a systematic overlap of the substance-mode relation and (a certain type of) causality in Spinoza. Obviously, one can claim that God is both the subject of inherence of all modes and the cause of all modes, and yet that the two roles are completely separate. 6 Though such a coincidence may seem atypical for a strict rationalist like Dem.: Everything that is, is in God, and must be conceived through God (by P15), and so (by P16C1) God is the cause of [NS: all] things, which are in him. That is the first [thing to be proven]. And then outside God there can be no substance (by P14), i.e. (by D3), thing which is in itself outside God. That was the second. God, therefore, is the immanent, not the transitive cause of all things. q.e.d. "The first thing to be proven" -i.e., that God is the immanent cause of all things -relies on two previous claims: that all things are (i.e., inhere) in God (E1p15), and that God is the efficient cause of all things (E1p16c1). Hence, causa immanens seems to be the merging of inherence and efficient causation. 9 Similarly, in the short Treatise, Spinoza presents an eight-fold taxonomy of the kinds of efficient cause that were common in his day. 10 One of these is the distinction between immanent and transitive causes. 11 Hence, there seems to be little doubt that causa immanens is just a species of efficient cause.
Here, however, we reach a certain perplexity. As John Carriero has pointed out, the inherence of modes (or accidents) in their subject was traditionally allied with material causation. 12 Suarez, for example, suggests that "God supplies 19 * * * In assimilating inherence with efficient causation -through the notion of the immanent cause -Spinoza seems to be breaking with the Aristotelian tradition. The Aristotelians considered efficient and final causes as external causes, while the material and formal causes were internal causes. 20 In contrast, Spinoza claims, "I take it that an efficient cause can be internal as well as external" (Ep. 60). 21 Spinoza's reasons for this expansion of the notion of efficient causality are not quite clear. One may think that this expansion was motivated by the need to make God the efficient cause of the modes (which are internal to God). Yet, as Carriero points out, Aquinas and other medieval Aristotelians considered substance to be "sufficiently external to its accidents to support the intelligibility of [the substance's] efficiently causing an accident." 22 Spinoza might have rejected such a weak criterion of externality, and as a result had to allow efficient causality to be internal. One may also wonder why Spinoza avoided the notion of material causality, which was traditionally associated with inherence. I suspect that for Spinoza the material causality terminology was too closely related to the Aristotelian notion of prime matter, a notion which Spinoza ridiculed as a fictional and selfcontradictory "extended thing without extension" (CM II, xii| I/280/19&32. Cf. CM II, x| I/270/13). 23 ). Hence, efficient causality is not necessarily linked with inherence. Let us now consider the converse. Does inherence imply efficient causation? It depends on the nature of the properties that inhere in the subject. I have argued elsewhere that a comparison between sections 95-96 of the Treatise on the emendation of the intellect and E1p16d shows that Spinoza considered modes to be propria that follow from the essence of the substance. 26 In E1p16c1 Spinoza derives from this that God is the efficient cause of the modes.
27 It would seem therefore that for Spinoza the relation of "x follows from y" entails that y is the efficient cause of x. We may conclude that for any thing x, x's propria are efficiently caused by x's essence. Yet, apart from God, all other things have properties which do not follow only from their essence (but rather from their essence in conjunction with external causes). The latter properties, though they inhere in their subject, 28 are only partially caused by their subject's essence. 29 Hence, it seems that inherence entails at least partial efficient causation.
Returning now to Curley's original question we bring our discussion to a close by suggesting that in the case of immanent causation the relation of inherence overlaps with the relation of cause and effect. In "On Bennett's Interpretation" Curley presents the same question in a slightly different manner. "[I]f a substance is by definition something causally self-sufficient, and a mode is, by definition, something causally dependent on something else, ultimately on the substance, we need some explanation of just how it is that a substance is a cause of its mode....One thing every interpreter of Spinoza agrees on is that Spinoza connects the causal relation with the relation of logical consequence, and it is not easy to see how the properties of a thing could be thought to follow from the thing itself, conceived simply as a subject of predication" (48). This stronger version of the question ("how the properties of a thing could be thought to follow from the thing itself, conceived simply as a subject of predication") would be difficult to answer were Spinoza's substance a formless, bare substratum. Fortunately, Spinoza's substance is not of such a nature; it cannot be detached from its attributes insofar as this will make the substance inconceivable, while Spinoza clearly asserts that everything is conceivable, or intelligible (E1a2). not only in the works of a heretic like Bruno (who makes matter divine and the generator of forms), but even in mainstream works, such as Suarez's. For Bruno's discussion of matter, see the fourth dialogue of Cause, Principle and unity. For Suarez on matter's causal powers and influence, see on the Formal Cause of substance, pp. 54-5. 24 "What cannot be conceived through another, must be conceived through itself." E1a2 entails that everything is conceived, and as Della Rocca points out (Representation, 9-13 and 173n10), at least part of what it is to conceive something is to render it intelligible. 25 In the short Treatise Spinoza seems to take the distinction between immanent and transient causes to be one of degree (see KV, II, xxvi [I/111/29-30]: "…they are nearest to internal effects."). 26 See my "Spinoza's Metaphysics of Substance: The Substance-Mode Relation as a Relation of Inherence and Predication". This point was made first by Don Garrett in "Spinoza's Necessitarianism" and "Spinoza's conatus Argument", p. 156-7, n. 24. 27 "E1p16: From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinitely many things in infinitely many modes (i.e., everything which can fall under an infinite intellect). E1p16c1: From this it follows that God is the efficient cause of all things which can fall under an infinite intellect." 28 The question remains, do these properties inhere fully, or only partially, in their subject? If the latter, does this mean that externally caused properties inhere partly in their subject, and partly in their external cause? I have not yet come to a firm conclusion with regard to these issues. 29 See E3d2, where Spinoza states that even when we are acted on, our nature is still a partial cause. 30 Indeed, Spinoza's God must be an immanent, and not transitive, cause, "since he does everything in himself, and not outside himself because outside him there is nothing" KV I, iii [I/35/20].
